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T HE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION in
fields of intellectual endeavor closely parallels the evolution of
mutual aid and assistance programs relating to more tangible forms
of property.' Under the authority of the Lend-Lease program2 during
the Second World War, there was an active exchange of rights in
patents and technical information among the Allies. Immediately
following the war, the United States, through foreign aid programs
such as the Marshall Plan,' helped to put the nations of Western
Europe back on their feet. During the following decade, however,
it became increasingly apparent that such unilateral aid was no longer
feasible or necessary. Nevertheless, it seemed clear that it was in the
interest of the United States, as well as of our Allies that all the nations
reach and maintain a high level of competence in many fields of
science and technology, especially those pertaining to military prepared-
ness. Toward that end, the United States established the Mutual
Security4 and the Military Assistance ProgramsY The latter program
t Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel (Patents), Head-
quarters, United States Army Materiel Command. B.S. in M.E., Drexel Institute
of Technology, 1933; LL.B., Washington College of Law (American University),
1940. Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
tt Captain, United States Army, Office of the General Counsel (Patents), Head-
quarters, United States Army Materiel Command. B.Ch.E. (Nuclear), Polytechnic
Institute of Brooklyn, 1961; LL.B., New York University, 1964; LL.M., Georgetown
University, 1968. Member of the New York Bar.
The opinions expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of any other person or the Department of Defense.
1. For a thorough discussion of the historical aspects of this problem see STAFF
OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., EXCHANGE Or PATENT RIGHTS AND TEcH-
NICAL INFORMATION UNDER MUTUAL AID PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1958).
2. An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, ch. 11, §§ 2-10, 55
Stat. 31 (1941).
3. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, ch. 169, 62 Stat. 137. See Surrey, The
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 509 (1948).
4. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-407 (1964).
5. The Military Assistance Program is specifically authorized by 22 U.S.C.
§ 2311 (1964).
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introduced the concept of standardization of equipment, so that imple-
ments of war would be interchangeable among the participating nations.
Consequently, an untrammelled flow of patent rights, technical data
and know-how relating to production processes and techniques, became
vital. Therefore, pursuant to the authority granted under the Mutual
Security Program, the United States entered into a number of inter-
national bilateral agreements providing for the interchange of patent
rights under certain circumstances and for a division of responsibility
for the unauthorized use or disclosure of privately owned technical
information. 6 While all of these bilateral agreements are intended
for ostensibly the same purpose, the language used varies considerably.
The purposes of this Article are to examine these agreements in detail
and to define their legal and practical impact on the participating
governments and on private individuals whose property may be affected
by their provisions.
II. PATENT AND DATA INTERCHANGE AGREEMENTS
A. General Functions and Purposes
An "Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights
and Technical Information for Defense Purposes" generally has three
stated purposes - to implement a prior mutual defense agreement
between the contracting nations, to assist in the production of equipment
and materials for defense, and to recognize and protect the rights of
private owners of patents and technical information. 7 It is the last
purpose which would seem to be the raison d'Otre of the interchange
agreements, for the mutual defense agreement from which the inter-
change gains its authority, prescribes a subsequent arrangement, to be
negotiated at the request of either party, to fix responsibility for private
claims of patent infringement or misuse of technical information occur-
6. The bilateral agreements were patterned after an early agreement between
the United States and Great Britain. See Interchange of Patent Rights, Information,
Inventions, Designs or Processes, Aug. 24, 1942, 56 Stat. 1594 (1942), E.A.S. No. 268.
Usually, the interchange agreements implement a broader defense agreement
between the two governments. See, e.g., Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with
France, Jan. 27, 1950, art. IV, [19501 1 U.S.T. 34, T.I.A.S. No. 2012. These agree-
ments provide, that upon the request of either contracting party, arrangements will
be negotiated to fix responsibility for private claims of patent infringement or misuse
of technical information occurring as a result of the agreement. It is further prescribed
that in such negotiations consideration should be given to each government's assump-
tion of responsibility for all such claims arising in its jurisdiction. See generally
Pasley & TeSelle, Patent Rights and Technical Information in the Military Assistance
Program, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 566 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and
Technical Information for Defense Purposes with Greece, June 16, 1955, [1955]
6 U.S.T. 2173, T.I.A.S. No. 3286; with Norway, April 6, 1955, [1955] 6 U.S.T.
799, T.I.A.S. No. 3226; with Belgium, Oct. 12, 1954, [1954] 5 U.S.T. 2318, T.I.A.S.
No. 3093. [Agreements once cited will hereinafter be referred to by country only].
[VOL. 13 : p. 457
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ring as a result of the defense agreements.8 The more general mutual
defense agreement usually presents a guideline for this negotiation:
each government should assume responsibility for all such claims
arising within its own jurisdiction. As will become apparent, the
interchange agreements fulfill their primary purpose only with respect
to technical information since there is no definition of responsibility
for patent infringement in any of the agreements. On the other
hand, the interchange agreements establish a flow only of patent rights,
and not of technical information. This is one reason why the inter-
change agreement is sometimes supplemented by a formal data exchange
agreement which sets out the mechanics necessary to effect the exchange
of technical information, the appropriate security measures to be
followed, and, by way of appendices, the technological areas in which
data is to be exchanged."
This apparent disparity between the stated purposes and the actual
effect of the interchange agreement reflects the pragmatic differences
between patents and technical data. A patent, by definition, discloses
to the public the subject matter for which the inventor has been granted
a monopoly.'" Therefore, the invention covered by the patent may be
practiced by any member of the public who cares to pay for a copy
of the instrument and is able to negotiate a licensing agreement with
the patent holder. Since the patent documents -themselves are acces-
sible to the public, the terms for transferring this information to a
foreign government can be easily incorporated into the basic inter-
change agreement. Technical information, however, is generally un-
known to the public." Therefore, the effectuation of the actual exchange
of this information must be provided for in a more detailed manner.
A formal data exchange agreement is utilized in order to accommodate
the terms of exchange to the individual exigencies occasioned by the
parties and the technology involved in the particular interchange.
The following analysis of interchange agreements will consider
the pertinent provisions in the order that they appear in the agreements.
8. See note 6 supra.
9. The texts of data exchange agreements are classified, and therefore un-
available for purposes of this discussion.
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964).
11. See generally R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS (1953).
3
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B. General Provisions
1. Utilization of Commercial Relationships
Usually, the first substantive article of the interchange agreement
relates to the role of the private sector. 2 It is this clause which is of
greatest significance to domestic contractors, for it obligates the con-
tracting governments to utilize existing commercial relationships or
to encourage the creation of such relationships wherever possible in
order to foster the flow of patent rights and information. In effect,
the article negates any implication of a duty on the part of the con-
tracting governments to expropriate private rights.' 8 Moreover, an
area of private enterprise is encouraged, namely, the traffic in patent
rights and information between domestic concerns and foreign govern-
ments or their chosen contractors. A significant side effect of
this practice is to relieve the Department of Defense of a great
administrative burden. 4
A proviso to the first article subjects any arrangements involving
private parties to the applicable laws of the participating governments.
Presumably, the proviso is addressed to the antitrust laws as well as
to the law of contracts and others. With regard to the former, however,
it is interesting to note that while cartels, consortia, and other inter-
national business combinations have been held violative of the Sherman
Act,' 5 such joint enterprises are condoned by our Government if they
represent an efficient means of effectuating an international agreement.
For example, an agreement between an American corporation and an
organization representing several European corporations was the result
of a recent cooperative production effort. Further, such arrangements
might provide for division-of-markets, patent cross-licensing and pool-
ing, and data exchange. Absent the foreign policy considerations, such
practices would be, at best, of questionable legality. 6
2. Data Provisions of the Interchange Agreements
a. Transfer of Information for Evaluation - The second article
of the typical interchange agreement is addressed to the duties arising
12. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and
Technical Information for Defense Purposes with Australia, Jan. 24, 1958, art. I,
[19581 9 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 3974.
13. For an example of an eminent domain statute in the intellectual property
field see 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1964).
14. It has been found that the private sector has taken the initiative in developing
the necessary commercial relationships. In that respect at least, the interchange
agreements have been successful. Westerman, International Exchange of Patent
Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes, 21 FED. B.J. 152, 155 (1961).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
16. See United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
460 [VOL. 13 : p. 457
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when information is furnished by one government to the other for
evaluation purposes only.17 In such cases, the recipient government
is obligated to keep the information in confidence and to use its best
efforts to insure that nothing will be done to prejudice the owner's
right to obtain "patent or other like statutory protection therefor."'
However, the obligation attaches only if the information itself is
appropriately marked with a restrictive legend" at the time of transfer.
It is not clear from the language of the article whether the term
"owner" is limited to private owners, or is intended to cover the
contracting governments as well. A substantial argument can be made
for the inclusion of the contracting governments within the scope of
the term, since, at least in the case of the United States, the Govern-
ment can obtain patents, and therefore it has a similar interest in
the protection of information in which it has a proprietary claim.
Moreover, nothing in the interchange agreements obligates the parties
to forward to each other all pertinent data for full utilization and dis-
closure, nor is there created an automatic license in one government
to use all such data controlled by the other government. Is it un-
reasonable to suppose a situation where one of the parties, in the
course of negotiating a subsequent data exchange agreement in a
specific field of technology, requests to see, for purposes of evalua-
tion only, data pertaining to that field which is owned or controlled
by the other government? Nevertheless, the more common applica-
tion of this article would seem to be in those cases where the trans-
ferring government possesses the data with restrictions, or, in the
parlance of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR),
with "limited rights."' An example of how this could arise is where
a domestic contractor undertakes a research and development effort
funded by the Government. The data subsequently provided under the
contract might include information which relates to items developed
at the contractor's private expense. This is commonly known as "back-
ground data" and absent contractual requirements to the contrary,
would be given to the Government, appropriately marked, with limited
rights. Such limited-rights data could be disclosed for evaluation
17. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and
Technical Information for Defense Purposes with Great Britain, Jan. 19, 1953, art. II,
[1953] 4 U.S.T. 150, T.I.A.S. No. 2773. The agreement with Australia does not
require that the transfer be for evaluation only, but stipulates that all transfers shall
be treated as such.
18. Id.
19. A restrictive legend will generally manifest the proprietary nature of the
information on which it is applied, a prohibition against use or disclosure, and the
intention to enforce the owner's rights under law against anyone who violates the
prohibition. See Armed Services Procurements Regs., 32 C.F.R. § 9.202-3 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as ASPRI.
20. See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 9.201(b) (1967). 5
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purposes to foreign governments; however, beyond that, very little
use could -be made of it.
2 1
Nevertheless, even if information is exchanged on a limited-rights
basis, the owner's ability to obtain patent protection for inventions
embodied in the technical data can be endangered in several ways.
Under the patent laws of the United States and many other countries,
a publication describing the invention or the public use of the invention
for a stipulated time prior to filing an application for a patent creates
a statutory bar to issuance of the patent.22 Of course, if the inventor
is aware of the publication or use, he may make application prior to
the lapse of the statutory period. However, it might be difficult to
discover an unauthorized publication or use in a foreign country in
time to file without prejudice.
Article II imposes a duty on recipient governments not to do
anything that will prejudice the owner's right to "patent or other
like statutory protection." However, this is somewhat confusing.
While there is statutory protection similar to patent protection avail-
able for rights in technical data in some foreign countries, United
States law contains no such concept. Copyright protection, which is
statutory in nature, is inappropriate in most cases for technical data.
Generally, in the United States, such technical information is pro-
tected under common law principles applicable to trade secrets. 3 And,
although disclosure could destroy the possibility of trade secret cover-
age, the language of the article seems to ignore this nonstatutory form
of protection and the irreparable damage which occurs when a party
is deprived of this protection by unauthorized disclosure. It would
therefore seem wise to change the article to prohibit any acts by the
recipient government which would prejudice the data owner's right
to obtain "patent or other protection" for his property.
b. Responsibility for the Use or Disclosure of Information -
Article IV -is the next clause of relevance to the immediate discussion.24
It is the principal data provision of the interchange agreement and
defines the respective responsibilities of the parties for the use or
21. See id.; Hinrichs, Proprietary Data and Trade Secrets Under Department of
Defense Contracts, 36 MILITARY L. Rev. 61 (1967).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964).
23. See Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Mich. 1959),
aff'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). See generally R. ELLIS, supra note 11.
24. Article III generally prescribes the mutual obligations of the contracting
parties to preserve the secrecy of patent applications pending in either country.
See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical
Information for Defense Purposes with the Netherlands, April 29, 1955, art. III,
[1955] 6 U.S.T. 2187, T.I.A.S. No. 3287.
[VOL. 13 : p. 457
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/1
SPRING 1968] INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS 463
disclosure of privately owned technical information.25 Thus the clause
supplements Article II. Often divided into two parts, the first portion
deals with information passed from the owner to his government and
then to the other contracting government. Although few interchange
agreements so state, the government-to-government transfer is, pre-
sumably, for evaluation or information purposes only. If the recipient
government uses or discloses the information without the owner's
consent, the article assumes that the owner will be compensated by
his own government, but it also prescribes that such payment shall not
prejudice any arrangement that the contracting governments might
establish respecting liability for the unauthorized acts. It is interesting
to note that the United States-France2 6 agreement qualifies this pro-
vision by explicitly placing the responsibility for payment on the recip-
ient government, while the United States-Great Britain agreement
prescribes, rather than assumes, payment by the owner's government.
The second part of Article IV discusses the transfer of technical
information by a national of one contracting government to the other
government at the latter's request (the British agreement covers re-
quests by either government). In this case, if there is disclosure or use
of the information (the British and French agreements speak in terms
of unauthorized disclosure or use), whether or not for defense pur-
poses, the recipient government is obligated, in accordance with its
applicable laws and upon the request of the owner, to provide the
owner with prompt, just, and effective compensation (the British and
French agreements also prescribe damages). Therefore, in most in-
stances, a contractor's ability to recover must rest on the law of the
nation to which he has transferred his information.
An interesting deviation from the standard Article IV is presented
by the United States-Italy27 agreement. There, an omnibus clause is
utilized which specifies that the use or provision (giving the informa-
tion to someone outside the government for his use), presumably
without the consent of the owner, of privately owned technical informa-
tion or patent rights in connection with defense production entitles
the owner to prompt, just, and effective compensation and the oppor-
tunity to protect and preserve his rights. However, if the use or
25. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and
Technical Information for Defense Purposes with Japan, March 22, 1956, art. IV,
[1956] 7 U.S.T. 1021, T.I.A.S. No. 3585.
26. Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical
Information for Defense Purposes with France, March 12, 1957, art IV, [1957]
8 U.S.T. 353, T.I.A.S. No. 3782.
27. The subject provisions are found in Article I of the Italian agreement.
Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information
for Defense Purposes with Italy, Oct. 3, 1952, art. 1, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 189, T.I.A.S.
No. 4693. 7
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provision is for other than defense purposes, the owner must receive
"due compensation." It is not clear whether the "due compensation"
for nondefense use is intended to exceed the normal compensation
for defense use. Nor is mention made in the Italian article of a division
or fixing of responsibility for use or provision of either type. The
implication would seem to be that the using government is ultimately
responsible.
It is difficult to understand the reason for the distinction in the
Italian clause between defense and other uses of data. Disclosure or
use of information without the owner's consent is detrimental to his
interest regardless of the use to which the data is put. As far as the
data owner is concerned, once the information is placed in the public
domain it matters little what motivated the disclosure.2" The only
distinction between defense and other uses is that when data intended
for defense purposes is used in some other way, there is a breach of
the interchange agreement. Therefore, the other contracting govern-
ment is the one damaged by such acts.
To clarify the language and intent of the standard Article IV,
an exchange of letters generally takes place between representatives
of the contracting governments. The letters recognize that either
government might incur liability under its respective laws for the
unauthorized acts of the other, and that, in such cases, there should
be adequate provision under the laws of the two countries for the
responsible one to assume ultimate liability.29 Further, nothing in
the agreement or letters is to be regarded as abandoning the principle
of the second facet of the Article that it is the recipient government
that accepts such liability for its own unauthorized use or disclosure
of proprietary information.
c. Legal Remedies for Data Misuse - The Interchange Agree-
ments only govern the relationships of the contracting parties and do
not operate to create causes of action for third party contractors.
Therefore, the domestic law of each country determines the rights of
aggrieved contractors. Several situations may arise in which con-
tractors will sue in American forums and be subject to our domestic
28. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Skinner, 166 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Smoley
v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 24 F. Supp. 294 (D.N.J. 1938), aff'd, 106 F.2d 314 (3d
Cir. 1939).
29. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State, to
Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador of Australia, Jan. 24, 1958, and Reply of same date.
For the DOD Directive on the interchange of proprietary rights see DOD
Directive No. 2000.3, 32 C.F.R. § 264 (1961), as amended, §§ 264.3(a),(b)(2)
(1967). See also Pasley & TeSelle, supra note 6, at 573-75. For a discussion of
whether the United States meets its treaty obligations to provide a remedy see
pp. 464-71 infra.
[VOL. 13 : p. 457
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law. Two possible classes of litigants may endeavor to sue the United
States for the unauthorized use or disclosure of technical information
pursuant to a mutual security program. Initially, if an American con-
tractor's information has been disclosed by a foreign government after
the United States has transferred it, the contractor will normally seek
recourse against the United States. Also American contractors may
press claims against the United States if a direct, unauthorized dis-
closure has been made by the United States to another contractor or
government. The second class of litigants is comprised of those
foreign contractors who, pursuant to a request by the United States,
transfer information to the United States. If unauthorized disclosure
occurs, the law of the United States is controlling under the second
part of Article IV.
Section 606 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961"0 presently
defines the extent of any private party's right to prosecute a claim
for data misuse against the United States Government. There are
four requirements which must be satisfied before a suit can be successful
under section 606. First, the information allegedly misused must be
"protected by law." Second, the information must be held by the
United States Government "subject to restrictions imposed by the
owner." Third, the information must be disclosed by the United States
Government "in violation of such restrictions." Fourth, the disclosure
must be "in connection with the furnishing of assistance" under the
Foreign Assistance Act. If these requirements are fulfilled, the owner
may seek an exclusive remedy against the Government for "reasonable
and entire compensation." The inability to qualify under section 606,
however, may leave the contractor remediless because of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
The section affords only partial protection to the owner. It does
not cover unauthorized use or disclosure by a foreign government
after transfer to that government by the United States. As already
indicated, Article IV assumes that the contractor's own government
will compensate him in this situation. However, since section 606 is
not applicable, the contractor will be unable to sue the United States,
and, therefore, for practical purposes he must sue in the foreign forum.
A foreign owner of data would also attempt to utilize section 606 to
redress unauthorized disclosure by the United States of information
directly transferred to the United States, or in an instance where the
contractor's government transferred the information to the United
States and the remedies available in the contractor's national forum
30. 22 U.S.C. § 2356 (1964). 9
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are inadequate. Two problems arise in this regard. First, does the
receipt of information by the United States from a foreign govern-
ment or contractor come within the wording "in connection with the
furnishing of assistance" under the Act? It would seem that it should.
Presumably the receipt of such data would be for consideration flowing
to the foreign entity. And, if the agreement embodying that exchange
of consideration finds its authorization in the Foreign Assistance Act,
the receipt and disclosure of the data would be in connection with the
furnishing of assistance. A second problem occurs when there is an
unauthorized use of data by the United States Government without
a concomitant disclosure to nongovernmental concerns. Whether the
data owner is a United States or a foreign national, no remedy for such
unauthorized use is provided by section 606. Additional questions
under the section turn on what information is "protected by law," and
under whose law it must so qualify; what type of, and how broad, a
disclosure is necessary; and, as pointed out above, how broadly
should the phrase "in connection with the furnishing of assistance"
be construed.
Unfortunately, there have been no reported court decisions under
section 606 and only one of any significance under section 506 of the
Mutual Security Act of 19541 - the predecessor to section 606.
In that case, Kaplan v. United States,8" the Court of Claims was asked
to decide whether the disclosure of privately owned information by the
United States Government to its domestic contractor to facilitate the
manufacture of articles to be furnished to a foreign government under a
foreign assistance program gave rise to a cause of action under section
506. The manufactured articles were to be delivered to the United
States Government for subsequent overseas shipment. Section 506
was essentially identical to section 606 with respect to the unauthorized
disclosure of technical information.
Citing the legislative history of the 1954 Act and of its prede-
cessor, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the court limited the applica-
tion of section 506 to those cases where the unauthorized disclosure
was to a foreign government by the United States. 8 Moreover, the
court stated that the plaintiff's rights were fully protected under section
1498 of the Judiciary Code.84 It is difficult to understand how any
rights in technical information can be protected under section 1498,
31. Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, § 506, 68 Stat. 852. The precursor of
section 506 was section 517 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, ch. 479, § 517, 65
Stat. 382.
32. 153 F. Supp. 787 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
33. Id. at 790.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1964).
[VOL. 13 : p. 457
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a statute addressed to patent and copyright infringement by or for the
Government. The only explanation is that someone - either Kaplan or
the court - was confused. According to the court's opinion, plaintiff
alleged that the Government by "disclosure of the patented article ...
violated his rights in the patented article. . . ."" Whether the quoted
language was actually the plaintiff's words, or a paraphrasing by the
court, is not really important. In any case, there is neither a statutory
nor common law cause of action for unauthorized "disclosure" of a
patented item. 6 On the contrary, a patent is infringed by the unau-
thorized manufacture, use, or sale of the invention covered.
7
That it was the court, rather than plaintiff, that was befuddled
is attested to by another statement in the opinion to the effect that
section 506 would ,be violated by the disclosure of "patented informa-
tion" to a foreign government by United States Government officials. 38
Moreover, plaintiff's petition apparently alleged three grounds for
recovery. The first was for breach of an implied contract for services
rendered; ,the second was for the unauthorized disclosure of "patented
information;" the third was for patent infringement compensable
under sections 1498 and 506. Therefore, the plaintiff correctly pleaded
the separate offenses of unauthorized data disclosure and patent in-
fringement. The court, however, merged the two together and dis-
missed both counts under section 506 on the ground that, since section
1498 provided a full remedy, there was no reason to extend the scope
of section 506 beyond the apparent intent of Congress. 9
The court also erred from a more practical point of view. Even
in the area of patent infringement, section 506 and section 1498 did
not provide identical remedies. It is true that both sections permitted
a suit for reasonable and entire compensation against the Government
for patent infringement.4" However, under section 1498 the plaintiff
can sue only in the Court of Claims while under section 506 he could
sue in either that court or in a United States district court. Further,
section 506 provided for administrative settlement of claims brought
35. 153 F. Supp. at 788.
36. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-93 (1964).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1964).
38. 153 F. Supp. at 790.
39. Id.
40. Section 1498 requires that the infringement be by or for the Government, as
well as with the authorization or consent of the Government. See TeSelle, Au-
thorization or Consent to Infringe Patents in Production for the Government, 26
GEo. WASH. L. Rgv. 583 (1958). Section 506 was far broader in its language,
requiring only unauthorized use of a patented invention in connection with the
furnishing of assistance under the Act. 11
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pursuant to the section41 and for a tolling of the statute of limitations4 2
during the pendency of such claims before the head of the department
concerned.4" Section 1498 provides no such general settlement author-
ization, and specific legislative power to settle section 1498 claims has
been granted to only a few agencies.44
With regard to the misuse of data, the Kaplan court emasculated
the only truly effective remedy available under the law. By holding,
in effect, that a charge of data misuse would be proper only where
the Government disclosed the data to a foreign government, the court
left the plaintiff to the mercy of the Tucker Act.41 Under that statute,
a data owner can recover if he can prove a contract, express or implied
in fact, between himself and the Government covering the data and
establishing an obligation not to disclose the data, and a subsequent
breach of that contract. There is no better case than Kaplan itself for
proving the futility of attempting to establish an implied contract
against the Government. There, plaintiff's first count for breach of
an implied contract was dismissed.46 In fact, there has been only one
case where an implied contract relating to technical data has been
proven.47 Of course, if the Government possesses data with limited
rights as a result of a research and development contract and the pro-
tected data is clearly defined by the terms of that contract, the plaintiff-
contractor would have an easier time of proving the existence of a
contract sufficient to satisfy the Tucker Act.
Thus under Kaplan there is no effective remedy if the Govern-
ment, under a mutual security program and pursuant to the request
of a foreign government, gives proprietary data to a domestic con-
tractor for the production of articles for the foreign government.
Also, a foreign litigant whose information has been transferred to
the United States and subsequently disclosed to an American con-
tractor would have no remedy under section 606 or the Tucker Act.
This result is especially anomalous in view of the fact that the great
bulk of data possessed by the Government with restrictions can, never-
41. The foreign assistance statutes authorized settlement by the head of any
department concerned.
42. The statute of limitations for patent infringement is six years. 35 U.S.C. § 286
(1964).
43. Section 286 provides for a tolling of the statute of limitations for a maxi-
mum of six years during the pendency of a claim before an agency authorized to
settle it. See generally Rotondi & Dobkin, Government Competitive Procurement
and Patent Infringement: Substance and Solution, 27 FD. B.J. 325 (1967) ; Sarago-
vitz, Administrative Claims for Patent Infringement, 25 FED. B.J. 113 (1965).
44. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2386 (1964). See also Saragovitz, supra note 43, at 114.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). See United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co.,
271 U.S. 212 (1926) ; Department of Water & Power v. United States, 62 F. Supp.
938, 949 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
46. 153 F. Supp. at 788.
47. Padbloc Co. v. United States, 137 U.S.P.Q. 224 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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theless, be legally provided to foreign governments for the purpose of
evaluation.4 Also, since the interchange agreements generally place
liability on a contractor's government for the unauthorized use or
disclosure of data lawfully transferred,49 the case where section 506
or section 606, as interpreted by Kaplan, would be of help to the data
owner can hardly be found. Perhaps the greatest damage done by
Kaplan is in the area of administrative claims, for, as the only decision
on the books, it is controlling and, therefore, results in the denial of
claims which otherwise might be justly settled.
Even if Kaplan is overruled or remedial legislation is passed,
there will still exist difficult questions of statutory interpretation. For
example, what status must data occupy under the law to qualify for
protection under section 606? At common law only data amounting
to a "trade secret" is so privileged.50 Broadly defined, a trade secret
is information which is not available to the general public, is treated
as secret by its owner, and is inherently valuable. The secret treatment
desired by the owner must manifest itself clearly, at least by a legend
placed conspicuously upon the data informing the recipient of the
nature of the property right claimed and the intention of the owner
to preserve that right. 1 Value is measured by the size of the invest-
ment in time and effort necessary to generate the data and the facility
with which others can acquire the same information.
Coexisting with the "trade secret" principle are two other con-
cepts: the definition of technical information in the interchange agree-
ments - information originated by or peculiarly within the knowledge
of the owner and not available to the public,52 and the concept of
"proprietary" data contained in diverse federal regulations, in particular
the ASPR provision concerning "data [pertaining to items which
private parties] have developed at their own expense."5" In the case of
the interchange agreements, it is possible that information disclosed
pursuant to a data exchange with a foreign country may not qualify as
information "protected by law" if that phrase encompasses only trade
secrets. However, section 606, unlike its predecessor, expressly pro-
48. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 9.201(b) (2) (1967).
49. See pp. 462-64 supra.
50. Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Mich. 1959), aff'd,
279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). See generally Kostos, Unauthorized Use of Technical
Data in Government Contracts: Remedies of the Data Owner, 6 B.C. IND. & CoM.
L. Riv. 753 (1965) ; Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 324 (1963).
51. See note 19 supra.
52. See, e.g., Agreement with Australia, art. VIII.
53. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 9.202-1(b) (1967). 13
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vides the notice element of a trade secret which is lacking in the inter-
change-agreement definition by making recovery contingent upon the
imposition of an express restriction on the data. Moreover, the section
would seem to assume "value" by providing for the recovery of dam-
ages by the owner. Therefore, it seems that "protected by law" as
used in section 606 was intended to mean only that the data be un-
available to the public.
Another problem under section 606 is the amount of damages
that may be recovered by the owner. There are two kinds of value
that a trade secret can possess. First there is the value of the monopoly
afforded the owner when he has data which cannot be duplicated at
any cost. Hence the damages suffered by the loss of that data would com-
prise, in part, the loss of profits that would have resulted from the fact
that this was the sole source of the product. Second is the value intrinsic
to that data which is capable of generation by others, as by reverse
engineering,5 4 but only at great expense. In such a case, the damages
might be the amount that the owner might reasonably have extracted
for the sale of the data, the amount that another would have had to
spend 'to create the data himself, or the cost of the data's creation
to the owner.
In terms of "accessibility," it would seem, strictly speaking, that
only data having the first value, monopoly value, would truly be un-
available to the public, and, therefore, only this data would qualify for
protection under the common law and section 606, or for treatment
under the provisions of the interchange agreements. Notwithstanding
this conclusion, in light of the purpose of the interchange agreements,
their mandate to encourage the participation of the private sector
wherever possible, and the frequent purchases by the Department of
Defense of data with limited rights because it pertains to items devel-
oped at private expense rather than because it is "proprietary," there
seems to be no question but that data with the second kind of value is
covered by the interchange agreements. Thus, it would seem that
"available" should mean reasonably economically available. The argu-
ment can also be adduced that ASPR's limited rights data is "protected
by law," other than the law of trade secrets. ASPR, by its terms,
prohibits the disclosure of limited rights data, except in narrowly
defined situations, such as the evaluation by a foreign government.55
54. Reverse engineering generally entails the examination of a product purchased
on the open market and a derivation, through precise measurement, of specifications
of all its essential parts. Although considered immoral in some circles, there is
nothing legally wrong with reverse engineering an article which is not the subject
of a patent.
55. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 9.201(b) (1967).
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Therefore, if that proscription is considered "law," the information is
protected. On at least one occasion, ASPR has been held to rise to
the dignity of a statute. 6 There seems little reason not to regard it
as such in the present circumstances. However, it is easier to establish
the point by combining the ASPR pronouncement with another "real"
law. Section 1905 of the Criminal Code makes it a criminal offense
for a government employee to make an unauthorized disclosure of
information which "concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus . . . of any person .... ." Thus,
section 1905 protects from disclosure data encompassed within the
ASPR definition.
Finally, the question is raised by the foregoing analysis of whether
section 606 and its predecessors fulfill the obligation of the United
States under the interchange agreements to provide a means of re-
covery for data owners suffering unauthorized disclosure. It is sub-
mitted that literally the statutes achieve that purpose. However, if the
Kaplan case represents the applicable law, the restrictions placed on
the section are such that -the good faith of the United States in meeting
its treaty obligations can be seriously questioned. Therefore, it is
urged -that Kaplan, because of its apparent shortcomings, be disregarded
in favor of the clear wording and intent of section 606.
3. Rights in Inventions
Article V of the common interchange agreement provides that
an invention owned or controlled by one party to the agreement may
be used by the other party without cost, so long as such use results
in no cost to the first party. 7 Several agreements have the additional
provision that where either government has the right to grant a license
under an invention without incurring liability, such a license shall be
granted to the other government."' As a substitute for this provision,
still other agreements state that where a government-owned or con-
trolled entity has the power to grant licenses to use an invention, the
other government is entitled to a license on terms at least as favorable
56. In G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 422 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963), the Court of Claims held that regulations
promulgated pursuant to statutory authority have the force of law and that a clause
made mandatory by ASPR but willfully or negligently omitted will be judicially
interpolated.
57. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate the Interchange of Patent Rights and
Technical Information for Defense Purposes with Turkey, May 18, 1956, art. V,
[1957] 8 U.S.T. 597, T.I.A.S. No. 3809.
58. See, e.g., Agreement with Australia. 15
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as those which would be granted to the first government or other
entities of that government.59
One agreement of particular interest is the United States-Japan
agreement. The provision in this treaty is the ownership-control type.
However, the article also applies to rights in technical data. In other
words, in addition to inventions, if either government owns or controls
data, the other government may use such data without cost. While
all of the other agreements assume an exchange of technical informa-
tion, the articles addressed to data speak only in terms of data with
restrictions and the division of responsibility for its unauthorized dis-
closure or use. Only the Japanese agreement requires that government-
owned or controlled data be disclosed to the other contracting party.
Technically speaking, it would seem that the Japanese agreement would
be the only one that authorizes a subsequent data exchange agreement
calling for an exchange without cost to the recipient government in
those cases where the data is not privately owned or controlled."0
In any case, underlying any Article V provision for the conveyance
of invention rights is the assumption that the inventions are covered
by patents or by applications for patents. The existence of an invention,
in and of itself, gives no right to the owner to exclude others from
practicing the invention.61 Rights in inventions are frequently the
subject of an agreement, but only where patent coverage is imminent
or where the rights accrue by virtue of the participation by the party
receiving the rights in the creation of the invention. The only way
to prevent others from practicing an invention, absent patent protection,
is to keep the invention a secret. In that case, the invention would
amount to technical information.
Because of the different provisions included in the agreements,
questions arise as to the nature of the obligation imposed by Article V.
One thing does seem clear. All of the instruments operate to make
59. See, e.g., Agreement with Belgium. The agreement with Great Britain is
unusual in that it contains the basic Article V clause, the first additional clause, and
a clause prescribing that:
Inventions made in United Kingdom Government establishments or departments
and owned by the National Research Development Corporation or Power Jets
(Research and Development) Limited or like agencies primarily established for
the purposes of holding and exploiting patents, shall, for the purpose of this
Article, be treated as though they were Government-owned.
60. The agreement with Japan also states that: "The two Governments shall
cooperate to ensure that, prior to . . . use, the using Government is informed of
any . . . established interests in the invention or technical information." The pro-
vision is peculiar to this agreement.
61. The legal attributes of patentable subject matter are set forth at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 100-01 (1964). "The inventor of a new and useful improvement certainly has no
exclusive right to it, until he obtains a patent. This right is created by the patent,
and no suit can be maintained by the inventor against any one for using it before
the patent is issued." Gaylor v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493 (1850).
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the use of an invention controlled by one party free of cost to the
other party. No document or other instrument is necessary to accom-
plish that end, nor are any acts by the controlling government a pre-
requisite to -the right of use. There is, however, a problem in deter-
mining the breadth of the right conferred. The article speaks of the
"use" of the invention for defense purposes. As mentioned above,
Article V is constructed on the premise that the inventions are covered
by patents. In most countries, a patent bestows upon its owner the
right to exclude others from "practicing" his invention. The "practice"
of a patented invention normally has three incidents: use, sale, and
manufacture. 62 Thus, the article literally addresses itself to only one
of the three rights - use. Does -this mean that the other government
is not entitled to manufacture or sell the invention as part of a defense
program?
The question is further complicated by an indication of congres-
sional intent which could very well be controlling. Section 506 of the
Mutual Security Act of 1954 imposes liability upon the United States
Government for the unauthorized "use" of an invention in connection
with the furnishing of assistance under the Act.68 When that section
was carried forward into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as
section 606, the wording was changed to "practice."64 This would
seem to indicate an awareness of the distinction between the terms.
Nonetheless, the change was probably made simply to clarify the section.
For if "use" were intended by Congress in the 1954 Act in its patent
parlance sense, the liability for infringement of patents covering articles,
as opposed to processes, would be virtually eliminated. In almost all
cases, the use of an item would take place overseas, beyond the juris-
diction of section 506. Only in those cases where a patented article
was used in the manufacture of another product, or where the process
of manufacture was itself patented, could section 506 be applied.
Moreover, in the interchange agreements "use" is generally defined
to include manufacture by or for the government.6 5 By so including
manufacture it would seem that sale is excluded. Thus, a participating
government receives the right to make and use patented articles at no
cost but, cannot sell them without incurring liability after they become
62. See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 9.107-2(c) (v) (1966).
63. 68 Stat. 852 (1954).
64. 22 U.S.C. § 2356 (1964). It is interesting to note that section 1498 only
permits recovery for the manufacture or use of a patented invention by or for the
Government. Thus, if Kaplan is carried over to apply to section 606, another
inequity is introduced: section 1498, in preempting section 606, not only short changes
the plaintiff as already discussed, but also removes his right to sue the Government
for an infringing sale of the patented article.
65. Most of the interchange agreements include this definition in Article VIII. 17
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obsolete and of no further value to that government. In those agree-
ments where "use" is not defined to include manufacture"0 it should be
assumed that it is impliedly included. If it is not so assumed, the anoma-
lous situation arises that the government has free use of a patented item,
but must either pay the patent owner for the right to make it, or
contract with him or his licensee to make it. 7 If the patent owner is
a United States resident, this would undoubtedly aid the United States
economy, but would hardly help to establish a production base abroad
- the sine qua non of the interchange agreement.
The additional clauses in Article V of some agreements require an
overt act - licensing by one government of the other government:
Presumably, the obligation to execute a license attaches only if the
clause appears in the agreement and if one of two situations exists.
Either title to an invention and the patent thereon is in one of the con-
tracting governments, or one of the parties has received the right
to sublicense along with its own license under the invention and patent.
Article V will be operative in many instances since a government
generally will acquire such rights under an invention primarily as a
defensive measure to meet future allegations of infringement brought
by the owner of the patent.'
The additional clause calling for licensing by an entity of one of
the governments on terms at least as reasonable as those which would
be given to the entity's government appears to be a variation on the
theme of the first additional clause. It is interesting to note that both
additional clauses never appear in the same agreement. Apparently it
was felt that in those cases where the second clause was used, the
basic provision was sufficient to cover the instances where a govern-
ment owns or controls an invention and that an actual license was
unnecessary. But, where the title or control is in an entity of the
government, a document should be executed.
One would suspect that the alternative use of first one and
then the other additional version manifests a refinement of thought
and that a discernible chronology in their utilization could be found.
However, this is not true, thus causing one to wonder what was in the
minds of the draftsmen when a particular clause was chosen. No clue
is offered 'by the identity of the parties; the various combinations of
provisions appear in agreements with both highly developed and lesser
66. See, e.g., Agreement with Great Britain.
67. Although not defined as such in any of the agreements, it would seem that
"use" should include the use of an invention for, as well as by, a contracting govern-
ment. Certainly, it was never intended that the interchange facilitate in-house
production exclusively.
68. See Rotondi & Dobkin, supra note 43, at 331n.34.
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developed countries, with European as well as Asian nations. The
necessary conclusions are that notwithstanding the literal differences,
the provisions were all intended to accomplish the same purpose, an
exchange of patent rights with neither party incurring liability, and
that the particular clause used was simply the result of an arbitrary
choice by its author.
Assuming arguendo that each agreement, regardless of the form
that Article V might take, gives to one government the right to practice
any invention owned or controlled by the other government, what is
the practical effect of this provision? There is little if any problem
with inventions actually owned by a government. But, under what
conditions does a government obtain rights less than title in an inven-
tion, and when do those rights include the right to sublicense others
so that it can truly be said that the government "controls" the inven-
tion? Generally, when a government participates, either by funding
or by providing personnel, facilities or equipment, it will receive some
interest in any inventions created pursuant to the endeavor. The nature
of that interest varies not only from government to government, but
from agency to agency within each government, and often depends
on the nature of the research program and the degree of government
participation. 69 In any case, where a government receives merely a
license with no right to sublicense, the other government gets no rights
in the invention. For that reason, the United States Department of
Defense - the principal agency of interest in this area - until quite
recently, inserted a clause in its research and development contracts
with private contractors calling for the right to sublicense others in
all those cases where the Government was entitled to a license in an
invention made in the course of the contract.7" In October, 1966,
however, a revision to ASPR deleted the sublicense provision.7
This revision was probably in response to a growing realization
that the interchange agreements were a one-way street with the great
bulk of information and patent rights flowing away from the United
States.7 2 The fault for this apparent failure of consideration does not
lie entirely with the foreign governments. Many of them are to a great
extent hamstrung by traditional domestic legislation restricting the
interests that they can take in inventions made by private government
69. See generally Dobkin, Patent Policy in Government Research and Develop-
ment Contracts, 53 VA. L. Rev. 564 (1967); Finnegan & Pogue, Federal Employee
Invention Rights - Time to Legislate, 55 MIcH. L. Riv. 903 (1957).
70. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 9.107-5(b) (1966).
71. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 9.107-5(b) (1966), as amended, Rev. 19, Oct. 1, 1966.
72. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (m) (1964) (Church Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961) ; S. Rtp. No. 588, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also
Dobkin, supra note 69, at 629-30. 19
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contractors or by government employees. To illustrate the complexity
and difficulty in this area the domestic laws of one of the European
countries with whom the United States has entered into an interchange
agreement will be examined.73
The law of the Federal Republic of Germany governing the rights
which employed inventors have to their inventions is protectionistic.
It is strange, indeed, that it was spawned by the Third Reich. While
the Second World War was yet in its initial stages, it became apparent
that the victor would be the side with the higher level of technology.
Germany was trailing the Allies in many scientific areas, including
the development of comprehensive radar systems. Therefore, an earlier
decision that proposed legislation defining patent-right provisions of
employment contracts be held in abeyance was reversed, and in 1942
a decree prescribing the treatment of employee inventions was promul-
gated and implementing regulations were subsequently issued.74
Among other things, this early German law, which applied to
government as well as private employees, provided that every invention
made by an employee must be reported; that an employer could take
title to an invention made pursuant to the assigned duties of the
employee; that in any case where title to an invention was so taken,
the employer had to compensate the employee;75 that the employer
had to apply for patent protection ;76 and perhaps most important, that
the law could not be affected by termination of employment and could
not be modified in any manner detrimental to the employee by an
employment or other kind of contract.77 This law persisted until 1957
when the present statute, based on the same principles, was enacted.7"
It seems quite clear that any agreement, such as that between the
United States and Germany, permitting the free use of an invention
73. For a comprehensive treatment of this area see STAFF Or SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
87th Cong., 2d Sess., THE LAW op EMPLOYED INVENTORS IN EUROPE (Comm. Print
1963). See also Holman, Patent Policies of Other Governments, 8 PATENT, TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION 94 (1964).
74. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., THE LAW or EMPLOYED
INVENTORS IN EUROPE 36-37 (Comm. Print 1963).
75. Compensation to the employee was based upon the utility of the invention,
the inventive effort expended, and the normal salary and duties of the employee.
76. If publication of the invention was inimicable to the employer's interests, he
could affirm the employee's rights in the invention and would not have to file an
application.
77. Lassagne, The Legal Rights of Employed Inventors, 51 A.B.A.J. 835, 836
(1965).
78. Law of Oct. 1, 1957, [1957] BGBI 756. Under the 1957 law, the employer
is not forced to choose between taking title to an invention or freeing it. He may take
a nonexclusive license and award less compensation to the inventor. Lassagne, supra
note 77, at 836. Further, the 1957 law, prescribes different criteria for compensating
the employee inventor: The problem presented to the employee which resulted in
the invention; the inventor's approach to the problem and method of solution; the
duties and wages of the inventor. Id. at 837.
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by one country only if the other country owns or has the right to
license that invention without incurring liability in either case, is not
going to inure very much to the benefit of the United States. Under
the German law, the only time that the United States would be entitled
to use a German invention without cost would be where the German
government has taken title and has paid a lump sum to the inventor.
Moreover, it would seem to be in the interest of the German govern-
ment and its contractor not to pay for the invention in a single payment
but to provide for royalty payments which under the interchange agree-
ment would be paid by the United States in the event it used the
invention. However, there is even some question whether the wording
of the interchange agreement - use of the invention without cost,
"except to the extent that there may be liability to a private owner" --
means that the using government must satisfy that liability or that
there is no right to use at all if such liability will arise. While the
former interpretation appears more reasonable, the consensus at the
Department of Defense seems to endorse the latter. Thus, under current
thought, the United States would get no rights in inventions owned
by Germany if royalties were chosen as the mode of payment for title.
III. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS
While the interchange agreements are designed to encourage and
facilitate the flow of technical information and patent rights between
the governments involved, such agreements are too broad to cover
situations -in which two or more governments desire to enter into
specific cooperative defense programs involving research, development,
and production. For those purposes, an executive agreement, the
"Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU), is used to formalize the
specific terms of each cooperative program.79 Although the State
Department sometimes sends observers to the negotiation of an MOU
and also gives advice as to the political and economic effects of the
agreement, the Department of Defense normally conducts the active
negotiations.
MOU's are sometimes the outgrowth of a data exchange agree-
ment"° where a higher degree of cooperation is desired than the mere
exchange of data or technical information for evaluation purposes. For
example, the contracting parties may wish to enter into a cooperative
79. The MOU's are executive agreements inasmuch as they are negotiated and
signed by personnel of the executive branches of the participating governments. They
are not, in the case of the United States, ratified with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and therefore do not rise to the dignity of a treaty.
80. See p. 459 supra. 21
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research program with certain defined goals and a division of effort.
As a technology expands and becomes more complex, it becomes
increasingly more expensive to advance the state of the art and to devise
new hardware; however, if the cost can be shared between two or more
governments, it is possible to achieve results for a fraction of the cost
to each government, with the added benefit of keeping the level of
technical competence of the participating governments on a fairly equal
level. Another type of cooperative agreement provides for the develop-
ment and production of a device or piece of equipment that is not
in being. This is exemplified by the present agreement between the
United Kingdom and France to research, develop, and produce the
Concorde supersonic aircraft. A third type of agreement provides
merely for the coproduction of an already developed article or system.
Of primary consideration here will be those agreements which prescribe
a research phase in the cooperative program. It is in these agreements
that the more difficult data and patent problems arise. However, re-
gardless of its nature, the MOU should be sufficiently clear and com-
plete to obviate, as much as possible, any disagreements in construing
the meaning of its provisions. Therefore, the negotiating teams should
include legal counsel well versed in the fields of procurement, patents,
and technical data in order to avoid the inclusion of any provisions
which would be impossible of fulfillment due to national laws, regula-
tions, or business policies and practices. 81
A. Contents of an MOU"2
In each MOU, an article on "Scope of Work To Be Performed"
sets forth the metes and bounds of the area or field which is to be
investigated and may describe the actual tasks to be performed by
the respective participating governments.88  Rather than burden the
MOU with too much detail, the listing of specific tasks and their
allocation may be set forth in one or more appendices to the MOU.
Provision is usually made for the modification of the appendices by
way of deletion, addition or change, so long as such modifications fall
within the scope of work set forth in the MOU. Additionally, an
81. See p. 482 infra.
82. Only the MOU provisions pertinent to patents and data will be discussed
in the text. Other articles of the MOU, some of which will be presented in footnotes,
include: "Introduction," "Finance and Duration," "Reports," "Access to Establish-
ments," "Security," "Effective Date and Official Language."
83. The "Introduction" article usually sets forth the law or previous treaties
or agreements which provide the basis for collaboration.
A "Finance and Duration" article spells out the amount of money (expressed
in a single currency, if feasible) to be spent on the project, by the year or task, or
for the complete research phase. The duration of the entire program and each of its
phases, as well as the mode of financial accounting, is also described in this clause.
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article, "Project Organization and Management," is especially tailored
for each project. If the project is complex, and the financial or other
contributions by the participating governments are not equal, then
provision must be made for a decision-making procedure - whether
decisions will be based on weighted votes, unanimous agreements, or
other arrangements of those having voting power in the management
structure provided for in the MOU. In this regard, it should be noted
that it is desirable that the management structure be given the authority
to decide all questions arising within the scope of the MOU in order to
minimize situations where decisions have to be made by higher
authorities.
An "Exchange of Technical Information and User Rights" article
is generally the most important and complex of any in the MOU.
This article usually includes definitions of terms used in the MOU such
as "technical information," "foreground information," "background
information," and "patents." For example, foreground information is
that information generated in the course of, or under, the cooperative
program and includes any invention or discovery, whether or not
patentable, conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the course
of or under the program. Background information is that technical
information necessary or useful to the program but generated outside
of the program either in government establishments or by contractors
employed to work on the program to the extent that such information
pertains to the specific tasks undertaken by such contractors under
the program. Usually, an exchange of both foreground and background
data is provided for by the MOU.
At present, most MOU's are written in such broad terms that
manufacturing data for commercial off-the-shelf items is included in
background technical information. This type of technical information
is almost never required in national contracts. It is unreasonable in
the opinion of the authors to require such availability to other partici-
pating governments or their contractors when such items can be pur-
chased off-the-shelf in those countries from the data owner or his
licensees. There is no reason why a national contractor should be
required to give up extremely valuable property to create competition.
Naturally, if the MOU covers development and production as well as
research, the problem becomes even more acute because the contractor
who supplied the data may lose the production contract to someone
using the data he supplied. Because the MOU does not generally
state the period of time within which background rights are to be
transferred from one participating government to another, the com-
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mercial firms to whom national contracts are awarded are often appre-
hensive that they will be required to transfer such rights for an in-
ordinate amount of time after the completion of their contracts.
Foreground rights in technical information and patents cause even
more difficulty, due to the different approaches to the problem em-
ployed by various governments. It is the policy of the United States
to take unlimited rights in all technical information relating to items
generated under a government contract, as well as at least a license in
all inventions made pursuant to the contract.8 4 Most foreign nations
take only a license for defense purposes in such data and inventions.
Thus, the United States may, without additional cost, license a foreign
government to use any or all foreground information developed in
carrying out a government contract, while similar reciprocal rights are
not ordinarily available without additional cost. Moreover, at least one
foreign government makes no distinction between foreground and back-
ground rights, and pays for both even for its own defense purposes."5
The article "Contract Provisions" sets forth with varying degrees
of specificity those types of clauses which must be included in con-
tracts let by each participating government in carrying out the coopera-
tive program. This article may also contain a requirement that none
of the contractors doing work under the cooperative program will
enter into commercial agreements which will restrict their ability in
any way to provide any of the rights called for by the MOU. A state-
ment may be included to the effect that all contracting will be done
where possible in accordance with the laws, regulations, and procedures
in effect in the country in which the contract is to be carried out.
The MOU also prescribes the conditions under which information and
materiel may be transferred to nonparticipating governments. It is
usually provided that the country in which information was generated
in carrying out the program must consent before any recipient partici-
pating government may transfer such information to a nonparticipating
government.
It is sometimes advantageous to include additional governments
in the cooperative program at various stages. The actual addition of
parties is generally accomplished by a supplemental agreement to the
MOU which eliminates the necessity of modifying the MOU to any
great extent. On the other hand, although each government entering
into an MOU of this type has every intention of carrying out the
entire cooperative program, there may be a compelling reason why a
party to the MOU desires to withdraw from the program. A "Termi-
84. See Dobkin, supra note 69, at 621-30.
85. See pp. 476-77 supra for discussion of the German statute.
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nation" article sets forth in detail the conditions under which a partici-
pating government may withdraw from the program by unilateral
action. Provision is made for notice by the withdrawing government,
after which the termination becomes effective upon the passage of a
specified period of time. Rights in information which have accrued
to the withdrawing government up to the date of termination usually
remain with it. Conversely, the withdrawing government usually re-
linquishes any rights in information generated under the program
after the effective date of its withdrawal. If the MOU covers a program
having production as one of its phases, a penalty may be included to
cover the increased cost of producing the item elsewhere due to the
terminating government's withdrawal from the program.
The MOU usually contains an article to cover situations in which
one or more of the participating governments desires to manufacture
the item in whole or part for sale to a nonparticipating government.
Before the sale can be made, there must be mutual agreement by the
participating governments that such sales are desirable. It is also
provided that there will be a recoupment of research and development
costs in the form of a levy placed upon such sales.
B. Impact of MOU on National Contracting Policies and Procedures
After the MOU has been executed, it sometimes becomes necessary
to change or implement the usual national contracting procedures and
policies so that the rights and the obligations agreed to may be effected.
Since participation in the national program encompassed by the MOU
sometimes represents a serious variance from established contracting
policies and regulations, it is the usual practice to convene prospective
contractors in order that they may be briefed about the international
program and advised of the unusual aspects and special contract clauses
which will be necessary to accommodate the national contracts to the
international program. As mentioned earlier, commercial firms con-
sidering participation in the program are seriously concerned about
such things as the period of time during which they will be required
to provide technical assistance, background rights, and data. Instances
in the past where such questions have been left open by the MOU
have led to serious objections by prospective contractors. Therefore,
as more experience is gained, the international agreements do tend to
become more specific in order to avoid problems in national contract-
ing. While it is desirable to keep the MOU broad in order to encom-
pass as many different situations as possible, it is important that certain
portions of the MOU be made specific to avoid objections from national 25
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contractors arising because of required deviations from normal policies
and regulations in the contracting field.
C. Typical Clauses for United States Contracts
As stated above, the fulfillment of a cooperative research program
generally requires that each participating government obtain from its
own contractors substantially more rights and obligations than it would
receive under normal domestic research and development contracts.
Provisions in the MOU might require certain rights in technical infor-
mation, data, and patents to be transferred from one participating
government's contractor to another participating government and its
contractors. These obligations must, therefore, be mirrored in the
national contracts of each government. In such contracts between the
United States and its contractors, it is permissible to deviate from
ASPR's provisions, provided the deviation does not violate any law
passed subsequent to the MOU. s6 For example, the ASPR contract
clause which grants to the Government a license in inventions generated
under a research and development contract does not give the Govern-
ment the right to grant sublicenses to foreign governments or interna-
tional organizations."7 Therefore, the clause must be revised to fulfill
an obligation of the MOU. s s The following discussion will focus on
suggested drafts of the patent and data clauses which are necessary in
order to tailor a national contract to the purposes and obligations of a
particular MOU.
Identification of Background Rights. - One of the first things
to be determined by each participating government in implementing
the program is what background rights, if any, its contractors own
or control which relate to the tasks or items for which they have con-
tracted. A typical clause for this purpose is, "Contractor shall identify
upon request any established background rights he may have regarding
the item or items contracted for under Project -------------------------
Notice of Restrictive Agreements. - It is equally important to
determine whether or not a contractor is prevented from supplying
information or -transferring rights because of prior restrictive com-
mercial agreements. The following clause not only requires notification
of any such restrictions, but also requires the contractor to agree not
to enter into any further restrictive agreements subsequent to his
86. ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1.109-4 (1966).
87. See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. J 9.107-5(b) (1966).
88. The type of patent rights clause to be inserted in United States contracts
is dependent upon certain criteria, a discussion of which is beyond the ambit of this
article. See generally Dobkin, supra note 69,
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acceptance of a contract to further the international cooperative
program.
Contractor agrees to notify the United States Government im-
mediately if contractor is subject to any license or other agree-
ment which will operate to restrict the freedom of any govern-
ment participating in the program to disclose information to other
participating governments of Project -- - , or to permit
its use by or for such governments. Contractor will use all
reasonable efforts, if requested, to secure the relaxation of such
restrictions. Contractor also agrees not to enter into any agree-
ment or arrangement which will result in restrictions such as are
described earlier in this clause.
Use of Background Rights for Research and Development. -
Generally speaking, it has been the recent practice to require the con-
tractor to secure to each participating government and its contractors
the right to use the contractor's background information and patents
for research purposes only under the cooperative program without
any additional charges. The following clause is illustrative of one that
might be used to achieve this result:
Contractor agrees to secure to each government and its contractors
participating in Project ------------ the right to use without
subsequent additional payment only for research and development
purposes under the cooperative program, background information
owned or controlled by contractor, together with any necessary
license under patents owned or controlled by contractor.
It is the view of the authors that this might be done on a best-
efforts basis rather than on a guaranteed basis. Prospective contractors
in some programs object strongly to granting rights to use their back-
ground technical information and patents, even for research purposes
only, without additional compensation. They argue that releasing such
technical information, even for such limited purposes, to a foreign
government or contractor entails a great risk of losing control of the
information. Even though there may be recourse open to him in the
Court of Claims if the United States Government misuses the informa-
tion,"9 the contractor feels that any recourse he may have against the
foreign government or its contractor is extremely complicated and
impractical.
Licensing of Background Rights for Defense Purposes and De-
fense Sales. - In most situations, the MOU will require that each
participating government obtain from its contractors engaged to work
89. See pp. 464-71 supra. 27
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on the program the contractor's agreement to secure to each of the
participating governments in the project the right to obtain, on fair
and reasonable terms, the licensing of background information and
patents owned or controlled by the contractor for defense purposes9"
and defense sales." Clauses to achieve these purposes are as follows:
Contractor agrees to secure to each participating government in
the program the right to obtain on fair and reasonable terms for
its defense purposes the licensing of background information
owned or controlled by contractor, together with any necessary
license under patents owned or controlled by contractor.
Contractor agrees to secure to each of the participating govern-
ments in Project -------------- the right to obtain for each
government and its contractors on request, and on fair and rea-
sonable terms, the licensing of background information and patents
owned and controlled by contractor for the purpose of defense
sales of any product developed in the course of work performed
under the cooperative program.
It is in this area of licensing background patents and information
to foreign governments and their contractors that prospective United
States contractors offer resistance. It must be remembered that in most
cases it is background information in the nature of trade secrets and
technical data, as well as patents, that give companies distinct ad-
vantages over competitors. Thus to require an American contractor
to license his technical know-how, data, and patents to a foreign
company that will then become a competitor in the world market
is asking the domestic firm to deliberately create competition where
none has existed.
Many questions have arisen over what is meant by licensing at
"fair and reasonable terms." Although no definition of the phrase has
appeared in any existing MOU of this type, a workable definition
would seem to be:
Fair and reasonable terms shall mean under terms and at a cost
mutually agreeable to the licensor and the prospective licensee.
In the event that mutually agreeable terms and cost cannot be
reached between the licensor and the prospective licensee, fair
and reasonable terms shall mean at a cost and on terms to the
prospective licensee no less favorable than any existing license in-
volving the same technical information or patents. In the event
90. "Defense purposes" generally means manufacture and use throughout the
world by or for the armed forces of a government. In the case of a participating
government that includes the furnishing of assistance by it on a grant basis to non-
participating governments and international organizations for mutual defense purposes.
91. "Defense sales" means sales by a government or its contractors to non-
participating governments for their defense purposes.
[VOL. 13 : p. 457
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 1
https://digit lcommo s.law.villa ova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/1
SPRING 1968] INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS 485
no license is already in existence concerning the same technical in-
formation or patents, fair and reasonable terms shall mean under
terms and at a cost of a similar license in a similar field or area.
A definition of this type should be included in MOU's wherever
applicable.
92
Levy on Defense Sales. - If the cooperative research program
is enlarged by modification of the MOU, or by a subsequent MOU,
to include development and production, it may be desirable to provide
for recoupment of research and development costs in sales of the
developed equipment to nonparticipating governments.98 A clause
similar to the following may be utilized in those situations:
In all defense sales by contractor, including sales to nonpartici-
pating government contractors, of any component, portion, sub-
system, or complete system developed under the program, the
United States Government will advise contractor of what levy,
if any, is to be applied by contractor to such sales. Any levies so
collected by contractor will be turned over to the United States
Government. The foregoing shall also apply to the sale by the
contractor by way of assignment or license of any patents and
technical information generated under the program. Defense sales
are defined as sales by the Government or its contractors to non-
participating governments for their defense purposes.
Technical Assistance. - It is a well-recognized fact that supplying
the technical information and the rights pertaining thereto is sometimes
insufficient to enable a licensed firm to design and set up a manufactur-
ing facility to engage in economical manufacture of the item in question
without some technical assistance from the firm which originated such
item and has manufactured it. Thus, there is included in the MOU
a requirement that each government and its contractors agree to make
available upon request to each of the participating governments and
their contractors engaged in the international cooperative program,
technical assistance on fair and reasonable terms. The following clause
is illustrative :
Con-tractor agrees to make available to each of the participating
governments and their contractors engaged in Project -------------
on fair and reasonable terms, such technical assistance (know-
92. Although disputes often arise over the interpretation of the MOU, no method
has yet been devised for their settlement. Binding arbitration has always been con-
sidered improper where the Government is involved. Nevertheless, advisory arbitration,
such as that used by the Civil Aeronautics Board in its international bilateral agree-
ments, seems worthy of consideration by DOD. See Agreement with Great Britain,
Feb. 11, 1946, art. XIII, 60 Stat. 1499 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1507.
93. For the DOD policy on recoupment of nonrecurring costs see ASPR, 32
C.F.R. § 7.403-42 (1966). 29
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how, trained personnel, jigs, dies, fixtures, other manufacturing
aids, etc.) as such government may desire to enable the results
of work performed under the cooperative program to be effectively
applied in their countries for the purpose permitted under the
program.
In addition to the provision of technical assistance, it is highly
desirable in most cases that technical personnel of the participating
governments and their contractors be permitted access to the estab-
lishments of other participating governments, such as laboratories and
proving grounds, and to certain installations of the contractors to
further enhance whatever technical information and assistance is sup-
plied under the cooperative program.
9 4
IV. CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this Article has shed some light on a little known
area of international intercourse. Although the patent interchange
agreements and the Memorandums of Understanding are governmental
transactions, it should be apparent that they present fertile ground for
private enterprise. On the other hand, these international programs
present still another opportunity for the abridgement of private pro-
prietary rights. Domestic legislation has attempted to mitigate some
of the abuses, but, as has been seen, it has not been entirely successful.
Unquestionably, part of the problem in this area lies in the
conceptual haze which clings to the entire field of intellectual property.
Perhaps as the growing significance of proprietary rights emerges,
more attention will be paid to them by lawyers and jurists in fields
other than patents. This is especially important with respect to the
law of technical data. This body of law has only recently developed
to the point where it can be recognized. Yet, it is conceivable in
this age of exploding technology that it will not be long before
activities turning on the sale and acquisition of technical data will
eclipse similar endeavors addressed to all other forms of property.
Hopefully, as ,the investments of time, interest and money grow, the
law will solidify to the extent that those involved in the activities
discussed herein will be better able to ascertain their rights and lia-
bilities. Until such time, however, lawyer and layman alike will have
to play it by ear; especially where intergovernmental relations force
the law to be more a question of diplomacy than of precedent.
94. The MOU generally contains an article relating to such access which provides
for the terms and conditions under which nationals of one participating government
may visit the premises of the other governments or their chosen contractors. Pro-
vision is also made for the protection of proprietary information which may be
disclosed to the visitors.
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